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Abstract A number of psychiatric illnesses have been
recognized to have some level of insight deficits, including
developmental disorders, such as Asperger’s Syndrome
(ASP). However insight into illness has not been empiri-
cally investigated in ASP and little research has examined
how individuals with ASP view their deficits. This is the
first study to assess insight and the relationship between
insight and externalizing bias (EB) in ASP. Participants
with ASP (n = 21) and healthy controls (n = 24) were
recruited. Attributional style was assessed with the internal,
personal, and situational attribution questionnaire. Insight
was assessed with both a clinician-administered and a self-
administered measure. Results revealed that EB was neg-
atively correlated with insight as assessed with the clini-
cian-administered but not the self-administered measure of
insight.
Keywords Asperger’s  Autism  Insight 
Social cognition  Attribution, externalizing bias
Introduction
Insight into illness is a widely recognized multidimensional
concept that encompasses awareness of illness, its symp-
toms, need for treatment, and the social consequences of
illness (Amador et al. 1994). A number of psychiatric ill-
nesses have some level of insight deficits, with the majority
of research focusing on the impact of poor insight in
schizophrenia (SCZ) (Amador et al. 1994, 1993; Quee et al.
2011). Like SCZ, individuals with Asperger’s Syndrome
(ASP) demonstrate poor social awareness (Johnson et al.
2009), but to the author’s knowledge, no one has empiri-
cally investigated insight into illness in ASP and thus little
is known about how ASP view their deficits.
Awareness and insight are two related but distinguish-
able concepts. Making a distinction between the two is
informative because while most of the research in autism
focuses on self-awareness, few if any efforts are directed
toward elucidating insight into illness. Markova and Ber-
rios (2011) argue that the constructs of ‘‘awareness’’ and
‘‘insight’’ are separable, thus requiring different methods of
investigation. They define awareness as a direct measure-
ment of the symptom or impairment, whereas insight is an
extension of awareness and incorporates how an individual
makes sense of the symptom or impairment. Therefore,
insight, the focus of this paper, is a more complex phe-
nomenon than awareness and requires an individual to
interpret their symptoms based on prior experiences and
self-knowledge.
Insight into illness is a difficult construct to measure as
it is based on individuals’ self-perception of their symp-
toms. This construct is closely tied to the positive illusory
bias, which is defined as the difference between a person’s
self-perception of their abilities and their actual abilities
(Owens et al. 2007). Studies investigating children with
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Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) have
shown that they tend to overestimate their abilities and may
not be aware of some of their limitations. Some researchers
have suggested that this lack of awareness may serve to
protect their self value without harming their self-confi-
dence (Hoza et al. 2004; Owens et al. 2007). Likewise,
insight into illness for diseased populations is an important
measure of their own understanding of their illness. While
individuals with limited awareness into illness may be
protecting their self-esteem, poor insight may contribute to
poorer treatment outcomes as commonly reported in
schizophrenia (Schwartz et al. 1997).
Unfortunately, little is known about insight into illness
in ASP even though it has been clinically noted that indi-
viduals with ASP often lack insight into their own social
and cognitive deficits (Carrington et al. 2003). Some case
studies have related poor insight with attributional style
and proposed that individuals with ASP may demonstrate a
stronger cognitive bias in assigning blame to others due to
the difficulty in recognizing personal roles in social inter-
actions (Berney 2004; Hare et al. 1999). Lombardo and
Baron-Cohen (2011) have further acknowledged that self-
awareness is necessary for understanding others roles and
perspectives. It is thus important to empirically evaluate
how individuals with ASP view both their roles and others
in social situations (e.g. social attribution).
Research in causal attribution with Autism Spectrum
Disorders (ASD) has focused on moral reasoning and
making moral judgments, such as attributing blame or
forgiveness. Overall, researchers explain that individuals
with ASD are able to make basic moral judgments (Leslie
et al. 2006) and understand social rules (Takeda et al. 2007)
but have difficulty incorporating intent and motives in
explaining moral decisions (Grant et al. 2005; Roge and
Mullet 2011). For this reason it is beneficial to examine
attributional style and how ASP view individual roles in
social situations as provided in the Internal, Personal, and
Situational Attribution Questionnaire (IPSAQ; Kinderman
and Bentall 1996). The IPSAQ provides a social situation
such as, ‘‘A friend refused to talk to you’’ and asks if this
situation happened because of you, the other person, or the
situation. The questions on the IPSAQ force the individual
to use self-knowledge and prior experiences to make a
social judgment. It assesses how individuals view their role
versus others in a social context. Overall, it provides a
standardized methodology to examine social attribution
and cognitive biases such as externalizing bias (assigning
blame to another person for a negative event).
No research to date has investigated a relationship
between insight into illness and social attribution in indi-
viduals with ASP and only few have investigated social
attribution bias (e.g., externalizing bias) in ASP. The cur-
rent preliminary study takes a novel approach to illuminate
insight by comparing the relationship between insight into
illness and externalizing bias (EB), a self-serving bias
within a social situation in individuals with ASP. Earlier
literature in SCZ has modeled EB as a defense mechanism
to maintain self-esteem through misattribution of negative
self-concepts thereby contributing to poor insight (Amador
et al. 1993). Moreover, misattribution in the form of
overestimating abilities (positive illusory bias) may serve
as coping mechanism in some clinical populations (Hoza
et al. 2004). Although one pathology in ASP is impaired
social awareness, individuals with ASP may also exhibit a
tendency to use EB in blaming others for their own deficits
in social situations. As a result, we wanted to test if indi-
viduals with ASP demonstrated different social attribu-
tional styles compared to healthy controls and also examine
the relationship between these constructs in ASP. We first
examined differences on the IPSAQ between ASP and age-
matched controls and predicted that controls would dem-
onstrate a higher EB than indivudals with ASP. We next
examined the relationship between measures of insight and
social attribution and predicted that scores on social EB
and level of insight would be inversely related. Therefore,
individuals with ASP with poor insight may demonstrate a
high social EB (blame others more than self for negative
situations) to protect self-worth as established in SCZ. A
similar relationship between self-worth and self-attribu-
tions for negative events was found in children with
ADHD; children with high self-worth, tend to blame others
for negative events (Hoza et al. 1993), indicative of a high
EB. We also wanted to explore if the hypothesized rela-
tionship between social EB and insight would be impacted
if insight was assessed with more than just an existing self-
report insight measure, Birchwood Insight Scale (BIS;
Birchwood et al. 1994), because research suggests indi-
viduals with ASP do not always rate deficits accurately on
self-report measures (Green et al. 2000; Koning and
Magill-Evans 2001; Russell and Sofronoff 2005). As a
result we selected the widely used clinician-administered
Scale to Assess Unawareness of Mental Disorder-Abbre-
viated Version (SUMD-AV; Amador et al. 1993). Finally,
an exploratory analysis examined the relationship between




Twenty-one individuals with ASP and 24 controls were
recruited for the study. The participants with ASP included
14 males and 7 females with ages ranging from 18 to 34
(M = 23.05, SD = 4.88). The healthy control group
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included 13 males and 11 females with ages ranging from
18 to 39 (M = 25.71, SD = 5.55).
Participants with ASP and healthy controls were
recruited at the Center for BrainHealth, University of
Texas at Dallas (UTD). The clinical group had a current
primary diagnosis of ASP as defined by the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th ed. (DSM-
IV; APA 2000) criteria. The diagnosis for the participants
with ASP was confirmed by the Autism Diagnostic
Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al. 2000) by
trained clinicians involved with the study. Participants
were excluded if their clinical status required inpatient
treatment, if they had a history of seizures, if they
reported substance dependence within the last 3 months,
or if they had an estimated IQ less than 80 as measured by
the WASI. The IQ cutoff was set at 80, as this investi-
gation was part of a larger intervention study in which
participants were required to have at least this IQ. Par-
ticipants who met all inclusion and failed to meet exclu-
sion criteria were enrolled in the study. All individuals
provided written informed consent to participate and all
procedures were approved by and carried out in accor-
dance with the UTD Institutional Review Boards.
Measures
Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS;
Lord et al. 2002)
The ADOS is a semi-structured assessment used for indi-
viduals suspected to have autism and consists of various
activities that allow the examiner to observe social and
communication behaviors. It includes four modules
depending on his or her expressive language level and
chronological age. Only Module 4 (for fluent adolescents
and adults) was administered and scored by trained raters
for the current study. The administration of the ADOS
module 4 consisted of all standard activities including the
optional daily living items in order to gather a detailed
history.
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence
(WASI; Wechsler 1999)
We calculated an estimated IQ from two WASI subtests:
Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning which has an average
reliability coefficient of .96.
Internal Personal Situational Attributions Questionnaire
(IPSAQ; Kinderman and Bentall 1996)
This measure assessed how individuals attribute causes to
social events (16 negative and 16 positive). Participants
attributed the cause of a friend’s behavior (e.g., ‘‘a friend
thinks you are trustworthy’’) to themself (internal attribu-
tion), another person (personal attribution), or an outside
factor (situational attribution). Three subscales were
derived from the 16 positive items by adding the number of
internal, personal, or situational attributions for the positive
situations and 3 subscales are derived from the 16 negative
items by adding the number of internal, personal, or situ-
ational attributions for the negative situations. Two social
attribution bias scores were calculated from the subscales:
an externalizing bias (EB) and a personalizing bias (PB).
The EB was calculated by subtracting the total number of
internal attributions for the negative items from the total
number of internal attributions for the positive items. Thus,
positive EB scores indicated a self-serving bias whereas
negative scores indicate a tendency to blame oneself more
for negative events than positive events. PB was calculated
by dividing the number of personal attributions by the sum
of the personal and situational attributions for either neg-
ative situations (PB negative) or positive situations (PB
positive). A PB score of less than .5 indicated a tendency to
blame the situation rather than the person for negative
events. Both the EB and PB demonstrate acceptable
internal reliability with a Cronbach’s alpha of .72 and .76
respectively (Kinderman and Bentall 1996). In the current
study, the Cronbach alpha coefficient was .72.
Birchwood Insight Scale (BIS; Birchwood et al. 1994)
This self-report scale was comprised of 8 items that mea-
sure different aspects of insight into illness such as
awareness of symptoms, illness, and the need for treatment.
The individual rated each item by choosing ‘‘agree,’’
‘‘unsure,’’ or ‘‘disagree’’ for each statement. Each item is
scored as 0, 3, or 5 and then summed for a total score. Low
scores indicated poor insight. The BIS has acceptable
internal reliability with a Cronbach’s alpha of .75 (Birch-
wood et al. 1994; Sapara et al. 2007). The current study
utilized a slightly modified version of the BIS to administer
to participants with ASP. The BIS assessed an individual’s
level of insight into their mental illness but since individ-
uals with ASP in our sample tended not to view their
diagnoses as a mental disorder, the words ‘‘mental illness’’
were replaced with ‘‘my diagnoses.’’ This observation was
based on our pilot testing of the original version of the BIS
whereby most participants with ASP needed clarification
for ‘‘mental disorder’’ and had difficulty answering the
questions. Additionally, for each question on the BIS, the
clinician clarified ‘‘my diagnosis’’ as the person’s diagnosis
of ASP. In the current study, it was verbally confirmed by
each participant that he/she understood the meaning of
‘‘my diagnoses’’ as having ASP. The Cronbach alpha
coefficient in this study was .32.
2756 J Autism Dev Disord (2012) 42:2754–2760
123
Scale to Assess Unawareness of Mental Disorder-
Abbreviated Version (SUMD-AV; Amador et al. 1993)
An abbreviated version of this semi-structured clinician
administered interview was utilized in this study. This
abbreviated version was comprised of three general items:
(1) Awareness of having a mental disorder; (2) Awareness
of the need for treatment; and, (3) Awareness of the social
consequences of the illness. For example, the clinician
asked ‘‘do you believe that your problems with social
situations are due to your diagnosis,’’ and the clinician
then proceeded to ask follow-up questions to clarify.
Trained clinicians then used a 5-point likert scale to rate
the participant’s level of insight into illness based on the
participant’s response and summed each item for a total
score. These same clinicians also administered the ADOS
and were able to use their best clinical judgment in
assessing level of insight. High scores indicated poor
insight. In the current study, the Cronbach alpha coeffi-
cient was .64.
Procedures
All participants completed written informed consent,
WASI, and IPSAQ. Only individuals with ASP completed
the two insight measures.
Statistical Analysis
Statistical analyses were conducted using Statistical Pack-
age for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 18.0. Means and
standard deviations were calculated for the demographic
variables (age and education), estimated IQ, IPSAQ scores,
and the two insight measures (SUMD-AV and BIS). Next,
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to
compare ASP with controls across the IPSAQ. Next, cor-
relations were run to investigate the relationship of scores
on insight measures with the IPSAQ. Finally, an explor-
atory correlation between the ADOS subtests with insight
into illness and social attribution was run. Some data vio-
lated the assumption of normality and therefore nonpara-
metric Spearman’s correlations were used.
Results
A summary of demographic information across both
groups is presented in Table 1. The ANOVA revealed that
the groups did not differ in education, age, or estimated
FSIQ using the WASI.
A summary of the insight, IPSAQ, and ADOS scores are
presented in Table 2. Based on an ANOVA, no significant
differences were found between the ASP and control
groups on the six IPSAQ subscales or the two cognitive
biases.




Age (years) 23.05 (4.83) 25.81 (5.89) .10
Education (years) 13.24 (1.70) 13.73 (1.56) .11
Estimated FSIQ
(standard score)
112.33 (10.59) 113.14 (11.17) .54
Vocabulary (t-score) 56.00 (9.98) 58.21 (8.35) .43
Matrix Reasoning (t-
score)
58.00 (4.61) 58.00 (7.08) 1.00
p \ .05*







8.53 (3.36) 9.16 (3.24) .59
IPSAQ: Positive personal
attribution
3.87 (3.20) 3.16 (2.19) .48
IPSAQ: Positive situational
attribution
3.60 (2.44) 3.68 (2.73) .93
IPSAQ: Negative internal
attribution
7.13 (4.07) 4.89 (2.64) .06
IPSAQ: Negative personal
attribution
5.67 (3.87) 6.53 (1.78) .39
IPSAQ: Negative
situational attribution
3.20 (2.07) 4.58 (2.85) .13
IPSAQ: Externalizing bias 1.62 (5.26) 4.13 (3.92) .08
IPSAQ: Personalizing bias
(negative events)
.58 (.23) .59 (.21) .86
IPSAQ: Personalizing bias
(positive events)
.45 (.37) .47 (.26) .83
Birchwood insight scale
total (0–12)
5.86 (2.19) N/A N/A
SUMD-AV 4.71 (1.74) N/A N/A
ADOS communication total 3.60 (1.73) N/A N/A
ADOS reciprocal social
interaction total




9.2 (3.56) N/A N/A
ADOS imagination/
creativity
.89 (.74) N/A N/A
ADOS stereotyped
behavior total
2.00 (1.03) N/A N/A
IPSAQ internal, personal, situational attributions questionnaire,
SUMD-AV scale to assess unawareness of mental disorder-abbre-
viated-version, ADOS Autism diagnostic observation schedule
p \ .05*
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Based on Spearman’s correlation coefficients, social EB
as measured by the IPSAQ was negatively correlated with
insight as assessed with the clinician-administered SUMD-
AV in patients with ASP (rho = .64, p = .002). In looking
at individual subscale scores on the IPSAQ, insight as
assessed with SUMD-AV was significantly correlated with
negative internal attribution (rho = -.66, p = .007) and
negative personal attribution (rho = .54, p = .04). There
were no significant correlations between the IPSAQ scores
and insight as assessed with the self-administered BIS-
MOD. The two insight measures, SUMD-AV and BIS were
also not significantly correlated with one another.
Finally, an exploratory analysis investigated the rela-
tionship between the ADOS subtests with insight into ill-
ness and social attribution. Spearman’s correlational
analyses revealed a significant correlation between the
ADOS Reciprocal Social Interaction subscale with the BIS
Treatment subscale (rho = .47, p = .04) and the ADOS
Communication subscale with the BIS Symptom subscale
(rho = -.49, p = .03).
Discussion
The aim of this study was to compare social attributional
style in relation to insight into illness in individuals with
ASP. We found no significant group differences in social
EB or PB between ASP and control groups. However, both
groups obtained positive EB scores, indicating a self-
serving bias. This finding indicated that social attributional
bias may not only be associated with psychopathology but
healthy controls may also have a greater tendency to use
personal rather than situational external attributions for
negative events (Taylor and Brown 1988). Taylor and
Brown (1988) described these adaptive misconceptions as
‘‘illusions’’ which enable a person to engage in productive
work. Positive illusions may promote positive mood and
may enhance cognitive abilities such as efficient use of
problem-solving and decision-making skills (Taylor and
Brown). Researchers have also shown that healthy adults
tend to inflate their abilities and evaluate themselves more
favorably compared to others, i.e., positive illusory bias
(Owens et al. 2007), which may again have a positive
impact on cognitive functioning and self-esteem (Taylor
and Brown).
Individuals with ASP showed a significant correlation
between EB on the IPSAQ and level of insight, but only
when insight was assessed with the clinician-administered
insight measure, SUMD-AV. Consequently, as ASP
become more aware of their deficits related to their diag-
nosis, they may believe that they are at fault for negative
social consequences which may contribute to a lowered
self-esteem. Therefore, as individuals with ASP start
recognizing shortcomings, they may become more aware
and sensitive to the consequences of their deficits. This is
not surprising, because researchers have found that as
individuals with SCZ gain more insight into their illness,
they may become more depressed (Cotton et al. 2012;
Drake et al. 2004; Saeedi et al. 2007) and tend to have
lower self-esteem (Drake et al.). In looking at the subscale
scores on the IPSAQ, ASP with high insight were more
likely to blame themselves for negative social events
(negative internal) and less likely to blame others for
negative social events (negative personal).
In comparing the two insight measures, it is possible that
higher scores on clinician-assessed insight scale may have
been a result of the specific questions used on the abbre-
viated SUMD-AV which contained more general questions
about the ASP diagnoses. The SUMD-AV administration
enables individuals to explain how they feel about their
diagnoses, previous treatment, and social deficits. The
SUMD-AV was also designed to address insight across
major psychiatric disorders. The self-report BIS may have
been too specific and too symptom-based for individuals
with ASP despite our modification. It is also possible that
some individuals with ASP do not exhibit certain symp-
toms and for this reason may appear to lack insight into the
illness. Therefore, the lower scores may not necessarily
indicate lack of insight but rather a lack of symptoms. This
may help explain why EB was only correlated with
SUMD-AV and not BIS. Previous studies have noted that
individuals with ASP often do not accurately rate deficits in
self-reports (Green et al. 2000; Koning and Magill-Evans
2001; Russell and Sofronoff 2005). However, there is no
self-report or clinician-administered measure of insight
designed specifically for individuals with ASP despite the
limited self and social awareness commonly cited in this
population.
Of note, we did not find any relationship between the
two insight measures. This may again be a result of the
nature of each measure. The self-reported BIS was
designed specifically for individuals with SCZ whereas the
clinician-rated SUMD-AV was designed for use across all
psychiatric disorders. These two insight measures may
have also captured different psychological underpinnings
of insight deficits or may have assessed different degrees of
awareness of symptoms versus insight into illness. Again,
Markova and Berrios (2011) argue that ‘‘awareness’’ and
‘‘insight’’ are different constructs and often used inter-
changeably. Consequently, it is possible that in using the
SUMD-AV the clinician made a judgment about the par-
ticipants’ insight into illness in relation to their functioning.
The SUMD-AV allowed the clinician to account for some
level of severity and acknowledge individual differences in
the scoring based on each participant’s response and
explanation of their deficits. The BIS on the other hand,
2758 J Autism Dev Disord (2012) 42:2754–2760
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may have focused more on the participant’s awareness of
their symptoms, illness, and treatment. Additionally, the
BIS scoring may not fit as well with this population,
because higher scores indicate that the individual is
endorsing more problems and thus appears to have more
insight. It does not account for symptom severity and
individual differences. Therefore specific symptoms listed
on the BIS may not be relevant for a given individual and
the person will thus not endorse it. For example, one of the
statements on the BIS asked if the participant feels the need
to be seen by a mental health provider which some of the
participants responded that they do not think they need
psychological care. For some individuals, this is a valid
response and does not indicate poor insight. As a result, the
low insight scores for these less symptomatic individuals
will indicate poor insight which is not necessarily the case.
These differences in administration (clinician versus self)
and quality of scoring may help explain why social EB was
related to insight as measured by the SUMD-AV and not
the BIS.
In examining the ADOS subscales with measures of
insight into illness and social attribution, two relationships
with the BIS were observed. The Reciprocal Social Inter-
action subscale on the ADOS was significantly correlated
with the BIS Treatment subscale. This suggested that a
person who acknowledged a higher need for treatment may
be less effective in reciprocal social interaction. However,
these results should be interrupted with caution because
many of the participants in the current study did not
endorse a need for treatment for their ASP diagnosis as
measured on the BIS. There was also a significant rela-
tionship between the Communication subscale on the
ADOS with the BIS Symptom subscale. This finding
indicated that individuals with high insight into symptoms
related to their ASP diagnosis, were able to communicate
more effectively in a social interaction. It is important to
note that the overall mean for the Communication subscale
on the ADOS was the only score to reach the Autism cutoff.
The other subscales only met the Autism Spectrum cutoff.
The higher score on the Communication subscale indicated
a more severe range of functioning for this domain. There
were no other significant relationships with the ADOS and
one reason that the BIS was the only measure to correlate
may again be related to the idea that the BIS is a measure
of symptomology much like the ADOS. However, because
of the limitations of the BIS, it is difficult to fully interpret
these findings.
Overall these results indicate that insight into illness is
related to social attribution for individuals with ASP. There
was a strong relationship between measures of insight as
assessed with the clinician administered SUMD-AV and
social EB as assessed with the IPSAQ. In looking more
closely at individual IPSAQ subscales, insight was related
to how individuals with ASP attribute negative events
either to themselves (internal) or to others (personal).
Further investigation into the subscales in comparison to
controls would provide more specific information in
regards to attributional style. Other limitations include the
use of an abbreviated clinician administered scale to assess
insight and the use of an insight scale directed toward
individuals with SCZ. The insight measures were also
limited by their low internal reliability as calculated in this
study. Additionally, the SUMD was rated only by one
trained clinician which may have biased the scores. Future
use of this measure may benefit from having two raters that
reach consensus over ratings Therefore, the findings from
this study will need to be replicated in a larger sample size
using a more comprehensive scale for insight assessment
than the one used in this study. The current study was also
limited in that insight deficits in individuals with ASP were
not assessed by other informant raters such as close family
members or friends. An insight into illness measure that
addresses global concerns from multiple informants would
provide a more comprehensive profile of insight deficits. In
addition, the observation that different insight measures
may assess different psychological mechanisms, suggests
that an insight measure that directly assesses a person’s
understanding of how the symptoms relate to social func-
tioning may be more useful in comprehensively assessing
insight deficits. Finally, future research should assess self-
esteem and its relationship with insight into illness and
social attribution. Research in ADHD and SCZ have shown
that self-esteem plays a role in social attribution and an
investigation of the interactions between insight into ill-
ness, social attribution, and self-esteem seems warranted.
Despite these limitations, this study is the first to
examine and explore the relationship between social attri-
butional styles and insight into illness in ASP. These
findings fill a void in the ASP literature by providing an
empirical research study which investigated insight into
illness deficits in this clinical group known to lack social
awareness. Further investigation into the effects or con-
tributing factors associated with poor insight, will help
researchers and clinicians design targeted interventions for
individuals with ASP.
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